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ABSTRACT 
 
This article suggests a new concept of measurement for the EU’s oft-alleged democratic 
deficit based on two contributions. First, we turn attention to the administrative staff involved 
in policy-making rather than the (un)accountability of EUs’ parliamentarians and executive 
agents. Second, building on the idea that policy-makers’ legitimacy depends on the extent to 
which they can claim to represent some groups or social interests, we assess the extent to 
which Commission officials’ preferences reflect European citizens’ policy stance. Our results 
indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between the policy preferences of EU 
administrative staff and their home country population, which, we argue, can provide EU 
administrators a basic degree of legitimacy relative to their home country.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In what has become a voluminous literature, numerous scholars have examined and debated 
the EU’s democratic credentials (Majone 1994, 1998; Moravcsik 2002, 2004; Scharpf 2009; 
Kohler-Koch 2010; Wille 2010; Schmidt 2013). While the EU’s claim to output legitimacy 
appears to be broadly accepted, its claim to input legitimacy is still contested.1 This paper 
challenges the latter perspective, and contends that any abandonment of the input side would 
be premature. The reason is that discussions of the democratic deficit on the input side have 
tended to focus on electoral accountability. While electoral accountability is an indispensable 
component, it should not be the only criterion. Rather, as commentators on inclusion and 
democracy at the national level as well as contributors to the representative bureaucracy 
literature have argued, democracy also encompasses the composition of the permanent 
administration. This paper maintains that this argument likewise holds for the European 
Commission and the EU. 
 Departing from the emphasis on bureaucrats’ demographic background in traditional 
discussions of representativeness (Kassim et al. 2013: Ch. 2), this paper shifts focus from 
public officials looking like their principals to thinking like their principals. The central idea is 
that civil servants thinking like their wider community provides another way to achieve a 
‘government of the people’ (i.e. input legitimacy). This is important as responsiveness to 
public preferences is one of the key requisites of democratic governance (O’Toole 1997; 
Rothstein 2009). Using two original datasets collected by the authors, we find a significant 
match between the beliefs and policy preferences of member state nationals in the 
Commission and their compatriots at home. As such, even though these constituencies did not 
elect them, the Commission exhibits some degree of administrative legitimacy – an 
incarnation of what Lindseth (2010: 14) calls a ‘national legitimating mechanism’ for the 
normative and political powers exercised by the EU. By extending the representative 
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bureaucracy perspective to the EU and insisting on the inclusion of administrative legitimacy, 
the paper makes a new contribution to the scholarship on the EU’s democratic credentials. By 
introducing a new metric for the measurement of representativeness, which goes beyond the 
ascriptive characteristics of bureaucrats, it also contributes to the literature on representative 
bureaucracy. 
 
The state of the literature and beyond 
Following decades of debate, a consensus emerged that the EU’s claim to democratic 
credentials must rely on the output side (Scharpf 2006) -- that is, on the EU’s ability as a 
collective enterprise to provide benefits to citizens that states can no longer deliver 
individually. Any claims on the input side are necessarily limited (Follesdal and Hix 2006). In 
our view, however, such a conclusion appears to be premature. Many of the diagnoses of the 
EU’s democratic deficit on the input side have centred on the role of unelected executive 
agents (e.g., European Commissioners) and indirectly elected EU parliamentarians in EU 
policy-making. This limited electoral accountability of EU’s political leaders, so the argument 
goes, undermines the legitimacy of decision-making at the European level and leaves the EU 
open to adopt ‘policies that are not supported by a majority of citizens in many or even most 
Member States’ (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 537).  
 The strong emphasis on electoral accountability reflects the intimate relation that is 
presumed to exist between democratic electoral representation and the legitimacy of policy-
making (Scharpf 2006; Rothstein 2009; Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Piattoni 2013; Saward 
2014). Yet, while electoral representation remains a core aspect of legitimate governance, 
recent scholarship asserts that ‘contemporary democracies are evolving in ways that 
increasingly undermine the adequacy of these standard accounts’ (Kröger and Friedrich 2013: 
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156; Curtin et al. 2010; Montanaro 2012; Olsen 2013). A narrow focus on electoral 
accountability thus is likely to be both restrictive and deficient.  
 Starting from the observation that policy advice, development, interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement in the EU involves public officials from all member states, 
this article explores a new mechanism to improve accountability. Under the standard view of 
democratic legitimacy and electoral accountability, public administrations lack legitimacy 
almost by definition as ‘most issues and premises that guide administrative behaviour never 
reach the attention of elected politicians and citizens’ (Olsen 2013: 465; Peters 2010). Indeed, 
EU bureaucrats have only featured in the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit to the extent 
that they are considered to embody the remoteness of EU institutions or the power exercised 
by ‘unelected bureaucrats’.  
This paper, by contrast, is inspired by Waldo’s (1952: 81) contention that ‘a theory of 
democracy in the twentieth century must embrace administration’. The substantial public 
administration involved in EU policy-making processes is important for our overall 
assessment of the EU’s input legitimacy. The reason is that the considerable influence of the 
EU public administration over policy outcomes through the exploitation of bureaucratic 
discretion (Pollack 2003; Jabko 2006; Olsen 2006; Schafer 2014) creates a framework where 
popular policy preferences may influence EU policies even if the bureaucrats are not elected. 
The underlying argument links to a more basic conception of legitimacy based on ‘the extent 
to which [individuals] legitimately represent, or can successfully claim to represent, some 
group or larger set of social interests’ (Saward 2005: 179; Saward 2010, 2014). Since the 
existence of representative claims is central to establishing democratic institutions’ legitimacy 
(Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Riccucci et al. 2014), the contention advanced here is that 
administrative representation can ‘operate as a legitimacy enhancer’ (Gravier 2013: 833). The 
legitimacy of the EU institutions should thus be measured also in terms of the 
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(un)representativeness of the administrative staff involved in its policy-making – what Olsen 
(2006: 3) calls ‘administrative legitimacy’. 
Since the representativeness of public administrations increases ‘when the identity of 
the bureaucrat matches that of the client’ (Riccucci et al. 2014: 537), ‘administrative 
legitimacy’ can be operationalized by measuring the extent to which the policy preferences of 
policy makers reflect those of the wider population. If EU policies should be supported by a 
majority of its citizens (as argued by Follesdal and Hix 2006) and representation is ‘about 
giving accurate information on the constituents’ preferences’ (Piattoni 2013: 233), this is an 
important measure. Hence, although the traditional representative bureaucracy literature 
emphasizes the importance of public bureaucracies reflecting the communities that they serve 
in ascriptive terms, the extent to which bureaucrats share the same policy preferences as the 
wider population may provide a stronger measure of representativeness. 
 Although such a concept of administrative legitimacy may appear to be at odds with 
the impartiality requirement implicit in ideal-type Weberian bureaucratic decision-making 
(Weber 1978; Olsen 2006), three points are important. The first is that the Weberian ideal-
type has rarely been achieved in practice. Second, the desirability of Weberian dualism has 
been challenged even in theory. Third, recognition of expertise as a basis of the bureaucrat’s 
claim to legitimacy need not be inconsistent with the representative requirement. Hence, the 
concept of administrative legitimacy suggests a new metric for assessing the democratic 
credentials of the EU: namely, the extent to which the policy preferences of EU civil servants 
reflect those of their compatriots at home.  
 
New understandings of representation and liberal democracy 
Government accountability is conventionally taken to be established via regular, free and fair 
elections in which incumbents are ousted when the populace deems their performance 
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unsatisfactory (Curtin et al. 2010; Montanaro 2012; Kröger and Friedrich 2013). In lamenting 
the role and power in EU policy-making of unelected executive agents and indirectly elected 
European parliamentarians, much of the existing literature on the EU’s democratic deficit falls 
into this traditional framework.  
Yet, recent theoretical scholarship on representation and legitimacy expresses a need 
‘to enlarge the conceptualisation of democratic representation beyond elections’ (Kröger and 
Friedrich 2013: 163; see also Rothstein 2009; Peters 2010). This new literature is premised on 
the view that ‘a range of actors (…), elected as well as unelected ones, may succeed in 
making effective representative claims’ (Saward 2014: 731; Montanaro 2012). This line of 
argument is particularly relevant when the traditional territorial state – in which the standard 
view of electoral accountability and legitimacy has greatest validity – is challenged (Curtin et 
al. 2010; Lord and Pollak 2010; Olsen 2013). The European Union itself provides a salient 
example of such a setting, and thus is a candidate for exploration using an expanded 
conceptualisation of democratic legitimacy based on ‘non-elective modes of representation’ 
(Saward 2014: 733; Montanaro 2012). 
 The shift to non-elective modes of representation requires reconfiguration of the 
‘conceptual tools [required] to assess if, and when, non-electoral forms of representation can 
be democratically legitimate’ (Montanaro 2012: 1106). This paper focuses on public 
bureaucracy as one non-elective mode of representation. The choice derives from the fact that 
‘public bureaucracy is becoming an increasingly important locus for democratic activity’ 
(Peters 2010: 209; Rothstein 2009). EU administrators, for instance, are key players in the 
policy-making process, and are involved in all stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, public 
administrations are likely to represent this ‘institutional core’ behind governmental effort into 
the foreseeable future (O’Toole 1997). As such, an in-depth exploration of the extent to which 
administrations ‘can contribute to the achievement of democratic governance’ (O’Toole 1997: 
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458) is required. Since bureaucratic autonomy is ‘an organizational principle rooted in (…) 
the principle of separation of powers’ (Olsen 2006: 9), public administrations can influence 
policy outcomes via the legitimate use of bureaucratic discretion (Pollack 2003; Jabko 2006; 
Olsen 2006; Schafer 2014) – a further reason for a focus on their democratic credentials. 
The key question, however, is how public administrations can create political 
legitimacy. Building on the representative bureaucracy literature, this paper argues that 
‘administrative legitimacy’ (Olsen 2006: 3) is likely to arise from the representativeness of 
the administrative staff. Making sure that all relevant groups are present in decision-making 
processes can raise popular acceptance levels, and may thereby become ‘a possible instrument 
of legitimacy’ (Gravier 2013: 820). The crucial insight is that civil servants can be responsive 
to the desires of the public simply because they themselves think and behave in a similar 
manner. That is, as argued by Mansbridge (2009: 369-70), representatives ideally ‘already 
have policy goals much like the constituents’. This is important as democratic governance 
requires responsiveness to policy public preferences (O’Toole 1997; Scharpf 2006; Rothstein 
2009), which can therefore constitute an important source of legitimacy for public 
administrations (Olsen 2006).  
The degree to which public administrations (and administrators) ‘can successfully 
claim to represent some group or larger set of social interests’ (Saward 2005: 179; Saward 
2010, 2014) – and thereby achieve administrative legitimacy – thus depends on the overlap of 
their policy preferences with the relevant constituent population. In the representative 
bureaucracy literature, this intersection – usually constrained to socio-demographic factors, 
but here extended to policy preferences (see also Murdoch et al. 2016) – is known as passive 
or descriptive representation. It is differentiated from active or substantive representation, 
which refers to action in the interest, or on behalf, of the represented (Pitkin 1967; Mosher 
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1968). The analysis presented in this paper rests solely on the passive overlap between the 
policy preferences of public officials and the broader population.2 
 
HOW REPRESENTATIVE? AN EMPIRICAL MODEL  
To operationalise the concept of administrative legitimacy, two complementary measures are 
proposed. The first rests on the idea that whenever one group (e.g., Belgian citizens) wants 
more/less of a certain policy relative to some other group (e.g., Irish citizens), public 
administrators representing these groups should – at the very least – replicate this preference 
ordering. This implies evaluating the cross-sectional correlation in the policy preferences 
expressed by EU administrators from a particular country and their country’s population.3 A 
positive correlation between the position of public officials and their principals along some 
policy scale represents a minimal requirement for administrative legitimacy. 
 A key issue at this point concerns the choice of the appropriate reference group in the 
EU setting: i.e. should Commission administrators’ policy preferences reflect those of the 
population in their home country, or those of the EU population as a whole? The former 
approach would require assessing whether Commission officials can claim legitimacy relative 
to their home country constituencies, though not necessarily to the overall EU population (and 
vice versa for the latter approach). Although important theoretically, this choice has no direct 
methodological implications. The empirical analysis below takes member state populations as 
the key reference groups because EU legitimacy is ‘normatively constrained by the basic 
compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituencies’ 
(Scharpf 2009: 173). In other words, the key issue is the extent to which the EU assists 
member states to ‘meet their own obligations to their own publics’, because the legitimacy of 
the EU can ‘be indirectly derived from that of its national democracies where any obligations 
it helps meet are those of national democracies themselves’ (Lord 2015: 5-6). Yet, the 
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methodological equivalence brought forward here implies that future studies can be developed 
taking the EU population as a whole as the reference group. 
A positive correlation between two sets of policy preferences need not necessarily 
imply that public officials from certain countries are ‘closer’ in a spatial sense to their home 
population than public officials from other countries. Yet, a larger ‘distance’ between the 
preferences of public administrators and their principals may weaken public officials’ claim to 
represent popular preferences. To capture more explicitly this spatial dimension of 
administrative legitimacy, our second operationalization calculates the Euclidian distance 
between the position of EU administrators and European citizens in a multi-dimensional 
policy space. The Euclidean distance between two points is essentially the length of a straight 
line connecting them. Imagine that these two ‘points’ are the policy preference vectors of an 
EU administrator (BUR) and the broader population (POP) along a number of dimensions 
(j=1,…,J) in the multi-dimensional policy space: (BUR1, BUR2,…, BURJ) and (POP1, 
POP2,…, POPJ). The distance between both sets of policy preferences can then be calculated 
for each public official i as: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸! =    𝐵𝑈𝑅! − 𝑃𝑂𝑃! !!!!!  (1) 
Hooghe (2003) similarly calculates the difference between the policy preferences of 
Commission officials and the EU population on a policy-by-policy basis to study relative 
support for EU policies between European elites and public opinion. Equation (1) generalises 
this approach to a multi-dimensional policy setting. Smaller numbers imply that the two sets 
of preferences lie closer together in the multidimensional policy space, such that EU officials 
can at least to some extent claim to represent the population’s underlying policy preferences 
(in the sense of Saward 2005, 2010) – and thereby achieve administrative legitimacy.  
This spatial approach is also close in spirit to the procedure proposed by Tsebelis et al. 
(2001) for assessing the degree of adoption of European Parliament amendments in co-
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decision procedures. Tsebelis et al. (2001) code the degree of amendment adoption on a five-
point scale (i.e. adopted, largely adopted, partially adopted, modified, not adopted), depending 
on how extensively the draft legislations changed in line with amendments proposed. As such, 
they essentially measure the ‘distance’ between the preferences of the European Parliament 
and the final agreement in a multi-dimensional ‘amendment space’.  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data and operationalisation 
To assess how including administrative legitimacy affects the EU’s legitimacy shortfall, we 
draw on a unique new dataset that combines information from Eurobarometer surveys of 
public opinion with information collected via two web-based surveys among EU civil 
servants. Both surveys generated comprehensive information about respondents’ policy 
preferences, but this paper concentrates on preferences regarding the appropriate level of 
decision-making within the EU as an issue of sovereignty (i.e. the authority to adjust the 
content of a given policy), rather than preferences towards specific public policy programmes. 
This choice was driven by three main considerations (for a similar approach, see Hooghe 
2003; Schafer 2014; Trondal et al. 2015). The first is that individuals’ ideological leaning is 
likely to affect their policy preferences, while such impact is weaker for opinions concerning 
the costs/benefits of EU integration. Second, preferences towards EU- or national-level 
policy-making are important independently of preferences regarding specific policies or 
decisions (Hooghe 2003). Finally, EU-level decision-making as an issue of sovereignty 
remains high on the political agenda and is often fiercely debated (Hobolt 2014; Murdoch and 
Geys 2014). This makes it an important issue from the perspective of the (administrative) 
legitimacy of the EU. 
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 The opinion of European citizens towards the EU polity and its activities is measured 
using Eurobarometer data. As an individual’s stance towards the EU may vary across policy 
areas, the approach here is to follow Hooghe (2003) in focusing on a Eurobarometer question 
that specifically refers to various policy areas: ‘For each of the following areas, do you think 
that decisions should be made by the national government, or made jointly within the 
European Union?’. Support for the first half of the statement (and thus in favour of national 
policy-making) is coded as value 1, while support for the latter half of the statement (and thus 
in favour of EU policy-making) is coded as value 2. The question is repeated for 18 policy 
areas (including ‘fighting crime’, ‘taxation’, ‘defence and foreign affairs’, ‘immigration’, 
‘health and social welfare’, and ‘the educational system’). This makes it possible to calculate 
the share of a country’s population that favours/opposes EU-level decision-making for each 
policy area – as well as an average preference across all policy areas. Our coding of public 
attitudes thus reflects the population share of a given country holding a specific opinion. To 
prevent the recent economic recession from affecting this measurement, we use information 
from the last Eurobarometer before the onset of the on-going financial crisis (Eurobarometer 
67.2 from 2007).4  
To measure Commission officials’ preferences towards the EU polity, data was 
collected via a unique web-based survey administered between January and April 2011 to all 
1098 then-active Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European Commission. The 
sample available for the present analysis consists of 379 respondents (approximately 35% of 
the total SNE population), and is representative in terms of age and gender. Its distribution 
across Directorate-Generals also reflects that observed for all Commission SNEs in 2011 (see 
also Murdoch and Trondal 2013; Trondal et al. 2015; Murdoch et al. 2016). To measure 
SNEs’ attitudes towards the EU project, the survey included a question asking: ‘Before 
entering the Commission, did you generally think that co-operation within the EU was 
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advantageous or disadvantageous?’ This question was asked both ‘in general’ and ‘within 
your portfolio’, and responses were recorded on a five-point scale from (1) ‘advantageous’ to 
(5) ‘disadvantageous’. Our coding of SNEs’ attitudes thus reflects their position on two five-
point scales. Although the phrasing of this question is not identical to that employed in the 
Eurobarometer survey, both questions concur in terms of their inference regarding the 
(dis)advantages of EU-level cooperation. This provides sufficient overlap in the meaning of 
both questions for it to be employed here. 
 The second dataset was collected in 2008 as part of the ‘European Commission in 
Question’ (EUCIQ) project, which investigated the internal operation of the Commission as 
well as the backgrounds, beliefs and careers of its officials (Kassim et al., 2013). The data 
collection targeted a representative sample of 4621 Commission officials selected from the 
Commission’s 14000-strong permanent administrative staff in policy DGs (excluding 
translation/linguistics). Similar to the Eurobarometer and SNE surveys, the EUCIQ survey 
contains a question asking: ‘We are interested in your views on the distribution of authority 
between member states and the EU on a range of policies. Where should this policy be 
decided?’ This question was asked for 11 policy areas (‘agriculture’, ‘energy policy’, ‘social 
policy’, ‘development policy’, ‘regional development’, ‘competition policy’, ‘environmental 
policy’, ‘foreign and defence policy’, ‘asylum and immigration’, ‘trade policy’, and ‘police 
and judicial cooperation’), and responses were recorded on an 11-point scale from (0) 
‘exclusively national/subnational’ to (10) ‘exclusively EU’. This question achieved 1618 valid 
responses (approximately 35% of the sampled population), and can be employed to measure 
the attitudes of permanent Commission staff towards the EU project (Kassim et al. 2013; 
Schafer 2014). Our coding of permanent Commission staff’s attitudes thus reflects their 
position on these eleven eleven-point scales (as well as their average position across all eleven 
policy areas). 
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Results for Seconded National Experts 
Table 1 reports pairwise correlations between the preferences expressed by seconded EU 
administrative staff and their member states’ populations regarding the desirability of 
(increased) EU-level decision-making in public policies.5 In column 1, the policy preferences 
of the SNE sample refer to their feeling about EU cooperation ‘in general’, while popular 
preferences are an unweighted average across all policy areas presented in the Eurobarometer 
survey. The remaining columns in table 1 analyse preferences specific to public policy 
programmes linked to six Directorate-General clusters (i.e. Market, External Relations, Social 
Regulation, Supply, Provision and Research; see note to table 1 for details). While clustering 
different policy programmes into Directorate-General clusters is necessary to retain sufficient 
observations among our set of SNEs for each policy area (see bottom row of table 1), the 
policy preferences of the SNE sample in this case refer to their feeling about EU cooperation 
‘within your portfolio’. These are then linked to the share of a country’s population that 
opposes EU-level decision-making in policy areas of relevance to that particular Directorate-
General. 
___________________ 
Table 1 about here 
___________________ 
The results in table 1 indicate that when the share of citizens in SNEs’ country of origin with 
positive (negative) attitudes towards the EU increases, SNEs from that country tend to also 
express a more positive (negative) opinion about cooperation within the EU in general 
(column 1). This positive correlation is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Furthermore, the remaining columns of table 1 indicate that the same positive correlation 
arises in four out of six policy areas. On the whole, therefore, this fairly consistent correlation 
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between public officials’ policy preferences and those of their home country populations 
implies that EU officials can at least to some extent claim to represent their home country 
population – and thereby achieve some degree of administrative legitimacy.  
Interestingly, the overall positive correlation observed in column 1 appears largely 
driven by the statistically highly significant – and substantively strong – positive correlation 
observed for the ‘external relations’ (and, to a lesser extent, the ‘social regulation’) portfolio. 
While the exact mechanism driving these results can, unfortunately, not be established based 
on our current data, this observation at least suggests that there rests a more stringent 
legitimacy requirement or constraint (in the sense of Scharpf 2009) on public officials dealing 
with ‘contentious issues such as foreign affairs and social policies’ (Schafer 2014: 912). 
These policy areas have also witnessed less integration. A higher degree of administrative 
legitimacy could thus be employed to counter potential fears that decisions at the European 
level in these policy areas are ‘not subject to the same controls as decisions at the national 
level’ (Andreatta 2011: 34).  
One might also wonder whether the results in table 1 are particularly strong/weak for 
certain countries. Since a country-specific analysis is impossible due to the very limited 
number of individuals from any given member state, we replicate the analysis for three 
country-clusters: i.e. countries in the original EU6 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the nine countries joining prior to 2004 (referred to as ‘EU9’: 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom), 
and the twelve countries from the most recent enlargement rounds (referred to as ‘EU10+2’: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). The results suggest that the correlation between public 
officials’ policy preferences and those of their home country populations is positive and 
statistically significant only for EU9 countries (r=0.263, p<0.001; details available upon 
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request). Hence, the overall positive correlation documented in table 1 appears driven by 
respondents from the EU9 countries. One possible reason is that these countries’ decisions to 
enter the EU followed a period of observation from the periphery of how the European 
Community functioned, and was based on a strategic calculus rather than a primordial 
response to the experience of war (as for the original Six; e.g. Gerber [1994]) or a reaction to 
new-found independence and a desire to re-join ‘Europe’ (as for many of the EU10+2; e.g. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier [2005]). In other words, the politics of EU membership 
differed significantly for the EU9, and followed repeated and protracted debates concerning 
the ‘sovereignty bargain’ inherent to the European integration process (Litfin 1997; Mattli 
2000).6 This can be expected to impose a more stringent legitimacy requirement on public 
officials from such countries. 
 
Results for permanent Commission administrative staff 
Table 2 turns to the EUCIQ dataset (Kassim et al. 2013), and reports pairwise correlations 
between the preferences expressed by permanent Commission officials and the broader 
population regarding the desirability of EU-level decision-making. Like table 1, the top row 
looks at feelings towards EU-level cooperation in general, with the preferences of EU 
officials as well as the general population representing unweighted averages across all policy 
areas. The first column again takes into account all available respondents, whereas the 
remaining columns constrain the analysis to respondents within six specific Directorate-General 
clusters (i.e. Market, External Relations, Social Regulation, Supply, Provision and Central; 
see note to table 2).7 The remaining rows of table 2 analyse policy preferences specific to nine 
detailed policy programmes brought forward in both the EUCIQ and Eurobarometer surveys. 
___________________ 
Table 2 about here 
15	  
	  
___________________ 
The results in the top row of table 2 again indicate that when the share of citizens in 
permanent Commission officials’ country of origin with positive (negative) attitudes towards 
the EU increases, Commission officials from that country tend to also express a more positive 
(negative) opinion about cooperation within the EU in general (row 1, column 1). 
Interestingly, the size of the pairwise correlation is nearly equivalent to that observed in table 
1 (0.078 versus 0.086). The remaining columns in the top row of table 2 are likewise in close 
accordance with the results reported in table 1. We again find a particularly strong positive 
correlation for respondents in the ‘external relations’ portfolio, though in this case we also 
observe a strong positive correlation for respondents in the ‘provision’ portfolio. Separating 
respondents by their country of origin, we also again uncover a statistically significant 
correlation only for EU9 countries (r=0.198, p<0.001; details available upon request). These 
findings not only corroborate the robustness of our results across independent datasets, but 
also – with relatively small deviations – across different types of Commission staff.  
 Importantly, the EUCIQ data allow us to take the analysis a step further, and look at 
the correlations of policy preferences at the level of specific policies. Extending our analysis 
in this way generates only a limited number of statistically significant correlations (see rows 2 
to 10 in table 2). Clearly, some significant connections will arise purely due to chance when 
calculating a substantial number of correlation coefficients (i.e. 63 in our case). Yet, it is 
noteworthy that all but two of the significant correlations in table 2 are positive, whereas 
finding positive or negative significant correlations should be equally likely if they arose 
purely due to chance. Moreover, the significant positive correlations once again arise near-
exclusively in the more contentious policy issues under analysis: i.e. foreign policy, social 
policy and immigration. These results thus are in close accordance with those obtained above, 
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which strengthens our confidence in the idea that contentious policy areas appear to induce a 
more stringent legitimacy requirement on public administrators in the Commission.  
 Having access to preferences expressed at the level of specific policies also enables 
calculation of the Euclidian distance between the policy-preference vectors of EU public 
administrators and the population in their member states. As mentioned, this complements the 
correlational approach by focusing on the spatial dimension of administrative legitimacy. The 
empirical approach here proceeds in two steps. The first is calculation of the Euclidian 
distance between Commission officials’ policy preferences and those of their home country 
population for all 1618 individuals in our sample. The second is to average the obtained 
distances for all respondents in each of the six Directorate-General clusters, and for all public 
policies. The results are reported in table 3.  
The most important information contained in table 3 refers to the relative size of the 
observed distances in the multidimensional policy space across DG clusters and public 
policies. This highlights which sections of the Commission are ‘closer’ to the policy 
preferences expressed by EU officials’ home country populations, which is informative even 
though the calculated absolute distances arguably lack a strong substantive meaning. We 
therefore also report the statistical significance of the difference between the mean of the 
distance measure in a given DG cluster (columns 2 to 7) and the mean of the distance measure 
calculated across all EU administrators (column 1). The asterisks in table 3 represent this 
additional information. Table 3 employs the same format as table 2: the top row displays the 
average Euclidian distance obtained for Commission officials in general (column 1) and 
within the six DG clusters separated in table 2 (columns 2 to 7). The remaining rows contain 
results by policy area, again calculated across all Commission officials and by DG clusters.	   
___________________ 
Table 3 about here 
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___________________ 
The results in table 3 indicate that there are only eight statistically significant differences 
between the average distance measure in a given DG cluster (columns 2 to 7) and the average 
distance measure calculated across all officials (column 1): four each at the 90% and 95% 
confidence levels. This is a low number given that 60 tests were performed and that the tests 
are not fully independent (since a lower average distance in one DG cluster compared to the 
average distance across all Commission officials must be ‘compensated’ by a larger average 
distance in at least some other DG clusters). The findings therefore suggest that there do not 
appear to be particular subsets of Commission officials – defined either in terms of their 
policy area or DG cluster – that are located particularly ‘close’ in policy space to their home 
country population. In other words, even though Commission officials’ policy preferences on 
the whole are positively correlated with those of their home country populations (see table 1 
and 2), this does not imply that certain subsets of EU public officials are located closer in a 
spatial sense to their home country populations. While such country-specific policy closeness 
can help administrators to act as a ‘national legitimating mechanism’ for the normative and 
political powers exercised by the EU (Lindseth 2010: 14), its absence might also be viewed as 
good news for the Commission. Indeed, while some degree of administrative legitimacy is 
obtained from the positive correlation in the policy preferences of EU administrators and their 
home countries, the lack of strong patterns in the calculated Euclidian distances suggests the 
absence of country-specific policy biases that might be challenging the autonomy of the 
institution as a whole.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to make three contributions to the literature on the EU’s ‘democratic 
deficit’. The first is the argument that administrative legitimacy, which has so far been absent 
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from the EU debate, needs to be applied in consideration of the EU’s democratic credentials. 
Such administrative legitimacy should be factored in as an important criterion of the EUs’ 
input legitimacy besides electoral accountability. Second, although the EU’s ratings may not 
match national political systems on the standard measure of electoral accountability or the 
existence of a demos, our analysis of original data illustrates that the European Commission 
scores much better on the representative bureaucracy dimension. This finding stands in direct 
contradiction to the popular view that the EU is undemocratic specifically on account of the 
Commission’s status and influence. 
 Our third contribution speaks to the literature on representative bureaucracy rather 
than on the EU’s democratic deficit. The measure used in this paper to demonstrate the 
representativeness of the Commission – i.e. the sharing of policy preferences – is new and 
novel. Historically, the representative bureaucracy literature has contended that an 
administration should reflect the ethnic, linguistic, national and/or gender composition of the 
wider community that it serves. The measure introduced in this paper goes a step further. It 
suggests that it is not sufficient for a public bureaucracy to look like the wider community, but 
that within its workforce there must be staff members who think like them.  
 
It is important, however, to observe that our analysis of administrative legitimacy is based on 
an objective standard of representation rather than citizen’s subjective perception thereof. 
This is important since it may be less straightforward at the EU level – compared to, say, the 
national or subnational level – for citizens to recognise whether their preferences are 
effectively represented. Such subjective aspect of administrative legitimacy – i.e. citizens’ de 
facto recognition of their bureaucratic representation – is an important avenue for further 
research. The same is true for the closely related question whether EU officials effectively and 
actively pay attention to their national publics. Finally, the limitations of our data did not 
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allow conclusive results regarding possible heterogeneity across policy areas. Future work 
should explore this in more detail. 
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NOTES 
1 In the foregoing literature, legitimacy is measured predominantly in terms of either policy 
outcomes (‘output’ legitimation; Majone 1998) or active citizen involvement in decision-
making processes (‘input’ legitimation; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Hix 2008). Schmidt 
(2013: 2) recently added a third factor – called ‘throughput legitimacy’ – which requires 
judgment “in terms of the efficacy, accountability and transparency of the EU’s governance 
processes along with their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people.” 
2 Although attitudinal similarity (i.e. passive representation) may be a necessary condition for 
active representation, it is certainly not a sufficient condition for acting upon those shared 
attitudes (Selden 1997; Sowa and Selden 2003). Hence, passive and active representation 
need not necessarily be causally connected. Even so, recent work often does find they are 
closely connected (Murdoch et al. 2016). This raises the potential concern that Commission 
officials following the active representation model might not be doing their jobs as 
supranational officials. Indeed, any potential lack of autonomy from member states is a key 
concern for international bureaucrats, since “what is at stake here is the very concept of an 
impartial ICS [i.e. International Civil Service]” (Mouritzen 1990: 35-36). For recent 
contributions on this autonomy issue among Commission officials, we refer to Ellinas and 
Suleiman (2012) and Trondal et al. (2015), while Weiss (2013) provides a discussion with 
respect to the same issue within the United Nations. 
3 The same approach allows evaluating increasing/decreasing legitimacy via administrative 
representation over time. That is, whenever (a segment of) the European population 
expresses increasing demands over time in favour of a certain policy, a minimal requirement 
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for administrative legitimacy would require that (a segment of) Commission officials 
likewise shows this temporal ordering of policy preferences. 
4 As an alternative measure of European citizens’ overall preference towards European-level 
policy-making, we also exploit the question: “Generally speaking, do you think (your 
country’s) membership is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?”. This allows 
calculating the share of a country’s population answering that EU membership is a ‘bad 
thing’. All results below are qualitatively similar using this alternative question (details upon 
request). 
5 As the dataset for SNEs does not include public officials’ opinion towards EU-level 
decision-making across a range of policy areas, we cannot calculate the Euclidian distance 
measure. Hence, we here only perform the correlational analysis. 
6 The concept of ‘sovereignty bargains’ refers to the trade-off in regional integration processes 
between countries’ reduced autonomy and the expected benefits from increased security, 
economic prosperity and/or political power. 
7 We exclude the Directorate-General cluster ‘Research’ as this cluster contains only 31 
observations. Instead, we can include an alternative cluster of ‘Central’ Directorates-General 
– which was impossible in table 1 due to the limited number of SNEs from such 
Directorates-General in our SNE sample. 
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS OF COMMISSION DIRECTORATES-GENERAL AND 
SERVICES 
 
Directorate-Generals 
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) 
Budget (BUDG) 
Climate Action (CLIMA) 
Communication (COMM) 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT) 
Competition (COMP) 
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) 
Education and Culture (EAC) 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL) 
Energy (ENER) 
Enlargement (ELARG) 
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) 
Environment (ENV) 
EuropeAid Development & Cooperation (DEVCO) 
Eurostat (ESTAT) 
Health and Consumers (SANCO) 
Home Affairs (HOME)  
Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) 
Internal Market and Services (MARKT) 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Justice (JUST) 
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Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) 
Mobility and Transport (MOVE) 
Regional Policy (REGIO) 
Research and Innovation (RTD) 
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) 
Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD) 
Trade (TRADE) 
 
Services 
Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
Internal Audit Service (IAS) 
Legal Service (SJ) 
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Table 1: Pairwise correlations between preferences of Commission SNEs and member state 
populations 
 General Market External 
Relations 
Social 
Regulation 
Supply Provision Research 
Correlation 
(p-value) 
0.086 * 
(p=0.096) 
-0.035 
(p=0.789) 
0.346 *** 
(p=0.009) 
0.158 
(p=0.126) 
0.089 
(p=0.464) 
-0.274 
(p=0.218) 
0.154 
(p=0.317) 
Number of 
SNEs N=379 N=61 N=59 N=94 N=72 N=23 N=46 
Note: Entries are	  pairwise correlations (with p-values indicating statistical significance in brackets). *** significant at 1%, 
** at 5% and * at 10%. ‘Market’ is Directorate-Generals COMP, ECFIN, ENTR and MARKT; ‘External Relations’ 
is Directorate-Generals ELARG, DEVCO, FPI, ECHO and TRADE; ‘Social Regulation’ is Directorate-Generals 
CLIMA, EAC, EMPL, ENV, SANCO, HOME and JUST; ‘Supply’ is Directorate-Generals ENER, CNECT, MOVE, 
RTD and TAXUD; ‘Provision’ is Directorate-Generals AGRI, MARE and REGIO; and ‘Research’ is Directorate-
Generals ESTAT and JRC (acronyms explained in appendix). 
  
30	  
	  
Table 2: Pairwise correlations between preferences of Commission permanent administrative 
staff and member state populations 
 All 
officials 
Market External 
Relations 
Social 
Regulation 
Supply Provision Central 
All policy areas 
Correlation 
(p-value) 
0.078** 
(0.002) 
0.066 
(0.309) 
0.166** 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.933) 
0.073 
(0.198) 
0.191** 
(0.011) 
0.103 
(0.245) 
Agriculture ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Competition ns -0.172** (0.008) ns ns ns ns ns 
Crime/police ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Defence/foreign 
policy 
0.055** 
(0.027) ns 
0.112* 
(0.097) ns 
0.103* 
(0.071) ns 
0.172* 
(0.054) 
Energy 0.072** 
(0.004) ns ns ns 
0.184** 
(0.001) ns ns 
Environment ns ns ns ns ns ns -0.182* (0.042) 
Immigration 0.093** 
(0.000) ns 
0.206** 
(0.002) 
0.128** 
(0.026) ns ns 
0.149* 
(0.096) 
Regional ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Unemployment/
social policy 
0.177** 
(0.000) 
0.125* 
(0.054) 
0.264** 
(0.000) 
0.219** 
(0.000) 
0.174** 
(0.002) 
0.146* 
(0.051) ns 
Number of 
observations N=1646 N=242 N=223 N=305 N=310 N=178 N=129 
Note: Entries are pairwise correlations (with p-values indicating statistical significance in brackets); ** significant at 5%, 
* at 10%, ns is not statistically significant. For division of Directorate-Generals, see note to table 1. ‘Central’ 
consists of BUDG, COMM, IAS, BEPA, SJ and OLAF (acronyms explained in appendix). 
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Table 3: Euclidian distance between preferences of Commission permanent administrative 
staff and member state populations 
 All officials Market 
External 
Relations 
Social 
Regulation Supply Provision Central 
All policy areas 0.705 0.700 0.711 0.714 0.704 0.702 0.702 
Agriculture 0.245 0.241 0.259 0.258 0.237 0.241 0.226 
Competition 0.210 0.204 0.228** 0.208 0.197** 0.212 0.220 
Crime/police 0.205 0.207 0.199 0.216 0.211 0.189 0.196 
Defence/foreign 
policy 0.205 0.198 0.215 0.208 0.194 0.217 0.201 
Energy 0.182 0.165** 0.186 0.185 0.176 0.190 0.193 
Environment 0.164 0.159 0.168 0.157 0.160 0.158 0.183* 
Immigration 0.208 0.197 0.217 0.213 0.207 0.215 0.193 
Regional 0.211 0.234** 0.198 0.219 0.227* 0.193 0.185* 
Unemployment/
social policy 0.194 0.191 0.193 0.185 0.209* 0.196 0.206 
Number of 
observations 
N=1581 N=229 N=209 N=297 N=299 N=174 N=125 
Note: Entries are distance measures calculated following equation (1). ** significant at 5%, * at 10%. In keeping with the 
importance of the relative size of the distance measure, statistical significance is calculated comparing the distance 
measure in a given DG cluster (columns 2 to 7) relative to the distance measure calculated across all officials 
(column 1). For division of Directorate-Generals, see notes to tables 1 and 2. 
 
